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 I would like, with your consent, to present here some remarks on the 
lecture that you delivered at Sèvres, the text of which I have just read. 
 And first of all I would like, for my purposes and yours, to take note of 
and to specify what it is that distinguishes you from Raymond Aron. This comparison 
is not arbitrary: it is your text itself that imposes it, most often implicitly, 
sometimes openly.1 And I do not believe that I am being unfaithful to your 
thinking in saying that the critique of the ‘subjectivist’ themes in Raymond Aron is one of 
the grounds of your text. This comparison, moreover, is not untimely. For Aron’s 
themes have, I dare say, fallen into the public domain, are known to all, and to 
many minds it appears as if nothing could be more obvious. 
 What distinguishes you from Aron is your problematic itself. Whereas 
Aron poses the question, “Is a universally valid science of history possible?” – 
which is to say that he, as Kant puts it, “doubt[s] […] its actuality”2 – you 
depart from the existence of the science of history, from its rationality, from its 
objectivity, as from something factually given. Whereas Aron poses to history, 
not the question that Kant poses to the sciences (the question of their 
foundation), but on the contrary the very question that he poses . . . to 
metaphysics (the question of its possibility), you reverse the perspective of 
Aron and return to the tradition of critique in posing to history a question that 
implies the prior recognition of its reality as a science. I will leave to one side 
for the time being the principle and the content of your question. But this 
reversal of perspective is of the utmost importance: it presides over the entirety 
of your critique. 
                                                      
1  “After the voluminous work of philosophical criticism which reached its climax with 
Raymond Aron’s book, perhaps we should now ask the following question: what is good and 
what is bad subjectivity?” Paul Ricoeur, “Objectivity and Subjectivity in History,” in History 
and Truth, trans. Charles A. Kelbley (Northwestern University Press, 1965), p. 30. 
2 Cf. Raymond Aron, Introduction to the Philosophy of History: An Essay on the Limits of Historical 
Objectivity, trans. George J. Irwin (Beacon Press, 1961), p. 10. Aron, moreover, is aware of 
transforming the sense of the “critical” question. He writes: “But instead of the Kantian 
formula: ‘Under what conditions is historical knowledge possible?’ we shall ask: ‘Is a 
universally valid science of history possible?’ ” It is not without interest to place, opposite 
this “rectified” Kantian problematic, some texts of Kant’s. For example: “we can confidently 
say that some pure synthetic cognition a priori is actual and given, namely, pure mathematics 
and pure natural science […]. We have therefore some at least uncontested synthetic cognition a 
priori, and we do not need to ask whether it is possible (for it is actual), but only: how is it 
possible […].” Immanuel Kant, Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics, ed. and trans. Gary 
Hatfield (Cambridge University Press, 2004), p. 26. Or again: “To ask whether a science 
might in fact be possible assumes a doubt about its actuality” (ibid., p. 6). It is true that the 
only feature common to both Aron and Kant is the “contested” character of metaphysics 
and of history. 
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  Indeed, at the moment that Aron asks himself the question, “Is a science 
of history possible?” he excludes in advance one response to his question: the 
very one that would dispense with the necessity of posing it, that which 
furnishes precisely the existence, the reality of the science. No longer wanting 
to find the response in the science itself, he seeks it outside of the science, at a 
level which is not that of the science: on the one hand, at the level of ordinary 
experience, self-knowledge, the knowledge of others, at the level of the 
experience of the man in the street, as he himself says; on the other hand, at the 
level of a philosophy of the historical object. In other words, Aron seeks a 
response to his question in a historical object that he constitutes outside of all 
scientific apprehension, and that he presents, as if so much went without saying, as 
the “truth of history.” It is necessary to recognize that this “truth of history” is 
composed of a background of immediate experiences cast in relief by 
philosophical notions: the experience of the “spectator,” of the “judge,” of the 
man who recalls his past and, in evoking it, transforms it; indeed, of the traveler 
who gets his ticket punched, the experience of the incommunicability of others, 
the experience of the retrospective passions of politics, of ideology, etc. . . . , 
the whole thing coated in philosophical concepts that consecrate the 
“equivocal,” “inexhaustible,” “complex,” “plural” character of history, the 
phenomenon of “recovery,” the preeminence of the future, etc. . . . From time 
to time this constitution of the object outside of the very level of scientific 
apprehension benefits from the moral support provided by the aporiæ and the 
difficulties that the historian encounters in his work. No matter that the latter 
are problems that have a sense only within the field of the constitution of 
historical knowledge; Aron transfers them to the object of history so as to 
consecrate its mysterious ambiguity. So it is not altogether by chance that Aron 
should pose to history the question that Kant poses to metaphysics: for the 
history that is going to furnish the expected response is indeed a metaphysical 
history. But, contrary to Kant, who refutes metaphysics, the metaphysical 
object, in the name of the conditions of objective knowledge, and of the 
existing sciences that provide him with its model, Aron refutes the empty idea 
of a possible science of history in the name of a metaphysic of history that he 
has first given himself a priori! In other words, the center of reference is not for 
him, as it is for Kant, the effective rationality of existing science, but the 
“truth” of an object constituted outside of all science. An extraordinary reversal 
of the Kantian problematic, under the cover of a “critical” protest! All of 
Kant’s efforts consisted in showing, precisely, that there is no sense in speaking 
of the “knowledge” of any object whatsoever outside of the very conditions of 
objectivity. It matters little, for the moment, in what ideal form he conceives of 
those conditions. The fact is that he conceived of them, and on the basis of 
existing sciences. The very idea of comparing, in order to adjudge the 
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 possibility of a science, the idea of that possible science with its purported 
object, unknown, and thus constituted outside of all objective apprehension as a 
thing in itself, is the very prototype of that metaphysical procedure which leads 
us right back to the precritical period and to its naiveté. 
 That is why it is important to note henceforth that your problematic, at 
least as regards its principle, excludes (or should exclude) every type of 
metaphysical judgment of that order. You quite rightly show that the level of 
history is not that of immediate experience,3 that history as a science is not, nor 
can it be, a resurrection of the past,4 that historical science is a knowledge of 
history and not the resurrection (whether integral or partial) of the past.5 
 It is at this level that it is possible to recognize in history a rationality “of 
the same kind” as that of the natural sciences. You show very well that the 
moments of scientific elaboration in history – observation, abstraction, theory6 
– correspond to the very procedures of the experimental sciences (which are at 
the same time theoretical, because experimental). The point at which your 
critique of Aron reaches its climax is your distinction between the good and the 
bad subjectivity. There you touch on the core of Aron’s sophisms. Aron’s entire 
undertaking effectively issues in what one could call an ideological theory of the 
science of history. For Aron, despite the reservations that he is indeed obliged to 
formulate in regard to certain domains (such as economics, even though his 
conception thereof is purely static and terribly summary), there is no objectivity 
and no rationalization of historical reality except in retrospect. If the facts 
(certain of them, at least, despite his celebrated formula concerning the 
“disintegration of the object”7) can sometimes be described, if certain 
structures can be educed and, as it were, read in the real itself, as soon as one 
rises to a certain level of generality there is no longer any recourse against 
retrospection. Put differently, as soon as one attains to a certain level of 
abstraction, that, precisely, at which every scientific theory is situated and constituted, one 
is hopelessly given over to the fatality of philosophical “choices” and of the 
“will” – in short, let us call it by its name, that name which he pronounces only 
                                                      
3 “Objectivity and Subjectivity in History,” p. 23. 
4 Ibid., pp. 23-4. 
5  “The objectivity of history consists precisely in repudiating the attempt to relive and 
coincide with the past; it consists in the ambition to elaborate factual sequences on the level 
of an historical understanding” (ibid., p. 24). 
6 Ibid., pp. 23-4. You quite rightly refuse to take up the opposition between comprehension 
and explication. Admirably, you write that history requires “ ‘theory,’ in the sense in which 
we speak of ‘physical theory’ ” (ibid., p. 25). 
7 You write: “Does the intrusion of the historian’s subjectivity signify, as some claim, the 
‘disintegration of the object’? By no means […]” (ibid., p. 29). 
3
Althusser: On the Objectivity of History
Published by OxyScholar, 2016
 in the final pages of his work, to ideology.8 All theory, in the sense in which that 
word is employed in physics, for example, in history is tainted with an 
irremediable relativism and arbitrariness. Why? Because (and these two reasons 
support one another, more or less as the box that Kohler’s chimp puts all of its 
energy into carrying supports the chimp once it has climbed on top of it9) – 
because the complexity, the ambiguity of reality, which, besides, reflects back 
onto the historian, radically precludes any theoretical unification, and because, 
in this sad situation, the historian makes a choice (in which he finds his 
grandeur and his consolation): he chooses the meaning of his past, he gives 
himself a priori a theory which is that of his people, of his class, if not simply 
that of his temperament. One sees immediately, in the grandeur of the 
historian, the poverty of his theory (and conversely). For the latter is not 
universal: it is only the translation of interests, of passions, even if noble, of 
philosophical preferences; it is only ideology. 
 It is that thesis of Aron’s which you condemn in speaking of “bad 
subjectivity.”10 It is remarkable, moreover, to see here, once again, Aron 
constrained, by his problematic itself, to take recourse to the most vulgar 
themes of immediate consciousness, and to attribute them to the possible 
historian so as to condemn him as he pleases.11 Is it useful to mention here 
that, in his Introduction to the Philosophy of History, Hegel had condemned, under 
the title of reflective history, the practice of that ideological retrospection, and 
appealed to a knowledge which surpassed that subjective relativism? It is 
certain, indeed, that ideology, far from constituting the very essence of every 
historical process, can be only one of the objects of the science of history, and 
that history, to be constituted scientifically, must surpass that level of 
immediate consciousness that ideology is, i.e., must show itself capable also of 
                                                      
8 Cf. Aron, Introduction to the Philosophy of History, p. 309: “We have come across the problem 
several times without using the term.” 
9 Aron himself acknowledges the “circle”: “It is vain […] to ask whether the historian’s 
curiosity or the structure of history is to be considered in the first place, since they refer to 
each other” (ibid., p. 44). 
10 “Objectivity and Subjectivity in History,” p. 30: “It is meaningless to say that history is 
relative to the historian. […] [The relativity of the object to a transcendental subjectivity] has 
nothing to do with just any relativism, with a subjectivism of will to live, will to power, or 
what have you.” 
11 You quite rightly say: “[History] always flows from the way in which traditional societies 
rectify the official and pragmatic arrangement of their past. This rectification is of the same 
nature as the rectification represented by physical science in relation to the first arrangement 
of appearances in perception and in the cosmologies dependent on perception” (ibid., p. 22). 
That is to state that the science of history is constituted in surpassing the level of immediacy 
and ideology. 
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 producing a theory of ideologies, so as to escape their grasp, which is to say, its 
degradation. 
❊ ❊ ❊ 
 But it is here, perhaps, that, having followed you to this point, I would 
separate myself from you in reproaching you, precisely, for having ceded to 
certain of the temptations and easy ways out that you so justly condemn in 
Aron. 
 Let us take up once again, for a moment, the problem of the good and the 
bad subjectivity, which is equivalent to that of scientific theory and ideology. What is 
the criterion that permits one to distinguish these two forms from one another? 
Does it suffice to say, as you do, that “the scientific object is always relative to 
an ordered mind,” to oppose an “investigative ego [to] a pathetic ego,” and to 
suppose the general theory justified solely by the intellectual virtue of its 
author?12 Presumably not, since to an interlocutor who asked you how to 
distinguish myth from history – let us say, historical ideology from historical 
science – you responded by giving other reasons: “though the employment of 
the critical method, through verification, and through the control exerted on 
one historian by others.”13 
 I do not know what you understand by the word “verification,” which 
seems to me to be of the utmost importance. But, taking it rigorously, it forces 
us to critique your analysis on certain important points, and even the principle 
and the content of the question that you pose to history. 
 What distinguishes you from Aron is that you take seriously the practice of 
the historian. But, if here I may broaden this confrontation, what would 
distinguish you from a Marxist epistemologist is the view that the practice of 
historian contains within itself, and itself alone, the grounds of the objectivity and the 
scientificity of history. It is symptomatic to see you “listen to the historian as he 
reflects on his craft, for he is the measure of the objectivity proper to history, 
just as his craft is the measure of the good and bad subjectivity implied by this 
objectivity.”14 And it is not only, presumably, the self-consciousness of the 
historian that you interrogate about itself, for it is often suspect, but his 
practice. But that practice remains purely internal. It bears on the criticism of 
documents, the establishment of “series,” the bringing up to date of theory. Let 
us say, so as to envision it in its broadest extension, that theory, too, is 
susceptible of an internal verification: the historian counts himself satisfied in 
                                                      
12 “Objectivity and Subjectivity in History,” pp. 30-1. 
13 See Paul Ricoeur, “Objectivité et subjectivité en histoire,” Revue de l’enseignment philosophique 
3.5-6 (1953): 42. (The sentence does not appear in the version of the essay published two 
years later in Histoire et vérité.) 
14 “Objectivity and Subjectivity in History,” p. 23. 
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 the measure that he will have taken account, with the maximum of coherence, 
of the greatest possible number of phenomena. But I do not see, then, how to 
escape, in all rigor, from arguments of the nominalist type: if it is a matter only 
of internal coherence, why should not several theories be possible? Which gives 
us over to the sophistries of Aron, who opposes, tirelessly, to the idea of a 
scientific history the “plurality of systems of interpretation.” How is it possible, 
moreover, to avoid that consequence when one recognizes, as you yourself 
recognize, in regard to the “choice” that the historian effects between different 
“factors,” that is to say, in the end, between different theories, that “the 
rationality of history depends upon this judgment of importance – a judgment 
which lacks, however, a sure criterion”?15 How can you at one and the same 
time accept the principle of Aron’s critique and refuse its effects? It seems to 
me that this contradiction results at once from your concern to defend the objectivity of 
history and from your purely internal conception of that objectivity. I would like to show 
that there exists a fundamental contradiction between your objective and your 
conception, or rather between the sense of your demonstration and its 
philosophical presuppositions. 
 What, indeed, is the ultimate truth of that “historian’s craft” which is the 
ground of the objectivity of history? I do not think that I am being unfaithful 
to you in saying that it is, first, that practice of rationalization which you 
describe following Marc Bloch. But that practice itself is only the putting to 
work (and into works) of an “endeavor for objectivity,” itself animated by an 
“intention of objectivity,” which is its ultimate foundation. What makes history 
is “the choice of the historian, the choice of a certain knowledge, of a will to 
understand rationally […].”16 
 I well understand that you conceive of this choice, with Husserl, not as 
an empirical, but as a transcendental one. I do not want to undertake here a 
critique of Husserl’s conception of the genesis of sciences: besides, you yourself 
have shown up its ambiguities and its formalism.17 And it is clear to see, 
certainly, that the transcendental character of this choice confers upon history a 
dignity that has precisely to preserve it against the encroachments of vulgar 
subjectivism and psychologism. But it is also clear to see that it can confer that 
dignity upon all historical works, whatever may be their economy. One sees 
only too often how that transcendental “intention of objectivity” can 
degenerate into a declaration of objectivity: what historian, or even pseudo-
                                                      
15 Ibid., p. 26. 
16 Ibid., pp. 25-6. 
17 In your article “Husserl et le sens de l’histoire,” Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale 54.3-4 
(1949): 280-316. See Paul Ricoeur, “Husserl and the Sense of History,” in Husserl: An 
Analysis of his Phenomenology, trans. Edward G. Ballard and Lester E. Embree (Northwestern 
University Press, 1967), pp. 143-74. 
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 historian, does not make a claim to objectivity? In truth, even were we to 
follow Husserl on this point, we would see that he did not define Galilean 
physics by a mere “intention of objectivity,” but that he gave to that objectivity 
a structure corresponding precisely to a general theory of the object of physics: “that which 
can be determined mathematically.” That this definition is still formal, let us 
leave to one side. What matters here is that this definition translates, and thus 
recognizes, the necessity of invoking the general theory of the object in order to characterize 
the objectivity of a determinate science. Put differently, to define a science it does not 
suffice to invoke, as you do, an “intention of objectivity” and to find that 
intention at all of the levels of the operations that it animates. For at this level 
of interiority and formalism, we have not advanced the least bit further than 
Aron, who will readily grant us all of the “intentions of objectivity” in the 
world, so as to oppose them each against the other. It is necessary that a 
science be defined in relation to the general theory of its object. And it is on just this 
point that you run into trouble. For you have indeed defended the necessity of 
a general theory of the object and shown its legitimacy from the point of view 
of objectivity in general, but you have not given any “sure criterion” that would 
allow one to characterize that theory, which, nevertheless, is indispensable. And 
it is not, in fact, in the simple circle of his “craft” that the historian can find 
that criterion. 
 You see in what direction I am pulling you, I hope without violence. For 
on this point I would like, following your example, to invoke the precedent 
furnished by the sciences of nature. There one sees in operation the cycle of 
observation, abstraction, theory. But there is added to it another moment: that 
of experimentation, which is not solely the experiment conducted in the 
laboratory, but the daily conducted experiment that consists in the countless 
effects drawn from theoretical acquisitions. Here I would like to advance a 
scandalous thesis, in saying that history, equally, can be a science only if it is 
experimental.18 To that one will object, presumably, that in history one cannot 
repeat an experiment as one can in a laboratory, which supposes the old 
Aristotelian schema according to which there can be a science only of that 
which is repeated. But why could not a theory find its verification in a reality 
subject to transformation, if the theory is precisely a theory of the transformation of 
reality? It seems to me, for example, that Marxism, a general theory of the 
development of societies, contains within itself the exigency as well as the 
                                                      
18 May I recall that Aron, in order to oppose history to the sciences of nature,” invokes, in 
the last instance, the fact that “science of its own accord discriminates between true and 
false,” “because it has available a criterion, experimental verification” (Introduction to the 
Philosophy of History, pp. 123, 126). Whereas history in essence does not have available such a 
criterion. Whence its polemical character and the “plurality of theories.” 
7
Althusser: On the Objectivity of History
Published by OxyScholar, 2016
 moment of submission to the practice of real history.19 When you say: “History 
makes the historian as much as the historian makes history,” we might agree 
with you if by history you did not mean that which the historian composes, 
rather than the living one – that to the necessity of which the historian is 
subject even as he makes it.20 And yet it is indeed this real history that effects the 
fundamental “critique,” as much of the subjective intentions of individuals as of 
the general theories that account for the development of social formations. It is 
of that “critique of history by itself” that Marxism is at once the product and 
the theory. But I return, to conclude, to our point of departure: it is for having 
sought solely in the practice of the historian the foundation of objectivity, and 
for having reduced that practice to an empty “intention of objectivity,” that you 
have been unable to adduce any “sure criterion” to distinguish between 
ideology and scientific theory. How, then, can you defend yourself against the 
arguments of Aron? It seems to me that you are attacking him from a position 
that you have surrendered to him in advance. 
❊ ❊ ❊ 
 It remains for me to show the ultimate effects of these concessions of 
principle: I have in mind your conception of the “proper” characteristics of 
historical objectivity, that objectivity which, in comparison to the objectivity of 
physics, is at once “incomplete” and “richer.” You develop that conception in 
the section devoted to the “subjectivity” of the historian. Is that an accident? 
You conclude that section by saying, “we have elucidated the constitution of 
historical objectivity as being the correlate of the subjectivity proper to the 
historian,” after having several times given the impression that the legitimate 
procedure was the opposite: “the objectivity proper to it […], rather than 
subjectivity, must be our point of departure.”21 It seems to me that this 
“reversion” follows, as regards its principle, from the “circle” of your internal 
conception of objectivity. But then, not having defined objectivity at its true 
level, that of the specific theory and of verification, you are going to give to 
that – up to this point, empty – objectivity a set of transcendental 
determinations, which either pertain to immediate consciousness or else belong 
to history as problems. That is going to expose you to the senseless 
undertaking that I described at the beginning of this text, in showing Aron 
                                                      
19 The first conscious affirmation of this principle is contained in the Theses on Feuerbach. 
Lenin and Stalin have constantly returned to this theme. It was, to cite only one example, 
that “critique” exercised by reality which led Lenin to correct Engels’ thesis on the 
possibility, for the proletariat, of taking power within the framework of bourgeois 
democracy. It was the “practice” of the 1905 Revolution that inspired his theory of the 
power of the “soviets.” The examples could be multiplied. 
20 “Objectivity and Subjectivity in History,” p. 31. 
21 Ibid., pp. 21, 30. 
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 comparing the empty idea of a science of history to a metaphysical object both 
fabricated out of whole cloth and supposed to be known. 
 I will not insist on the theme of the judgment of importance, the primary 
feature, as you see it, of the specific character of historical objectivity. It is 
necessary to choose which events are important. Granted. But every science 
knows this passage from phenomena to the essence, and you yourself have 
rightly said of physics that it “rectif[ies] […] the first arrangement of 
appearances in perception […].”22 Let us add, furthermore, that it is not a 
matter of choosing among phenomena immediately given, but of “thoroughly 
exploring the phenomena” and of arriving at their essence. Therefore, when 
you attribute to the “subjectivity proper to the historian” the transcendental 
category of the “judgment of importance,” you do not succeed in establishing 
an opposition between the “subjectivity proper to the historian” and the 
subjectivity proper to the physicist, but, on the contrary, you make evident 
another opposition: that of the scientific narrative (“the narrative is 
connected”) and of a “nature” of history (“that which actually took place is 
disconnected”), which for you has the sense, not of the immediate, but of the 
transcendental.23 
 What you say about causality merits more attention, because there you 
defend, against the “precritical naiveté” of the historian “dependent in varying 
degrees upon a popular conception of causality,” the very theses of Raymond Aron.24 
It seems to me that in your argument several themes are mixed up that do not 
appertain to the same level. First, a critique of positivism. A necessary critique, 
but one has nonetheless to give a precise account of its principle. Then, the 
idea that the historian has to “unravel and put [his] causalities into order” 
(antecedent, slowly evolving forces, permanent structure), and you cite as an 
example Braudel’s work on the Mediterranean and Philip II, a work that 
“marks an important date, from the point of view of methodology.”25 I cannot 
discuss on its own account the very questionable example of Braudel. I would 
like only to remark that the positivist conception of causality, as well as Braudel’s, are 
closely linked to general theories bearing on the content of history (the role of the 
economy, of ideology, of politics, etc. . . .); the fundamental scheme is 
dependent, ultimately, on the theory. Whether he be “naive” or not, “critical” or 
“precritical,” the historian always avails himself, so as to account for the 
evolution of societies, of categories fundamentally linked to a general theory. 
The history of the sciences makes that dependence patent. Therefore, when 
                                                      
22 Ibid., p. 22. 
23 Ibid., p. 26. 
24 Loc. cit. 
25 Loc. cit. 
9
Althusser: On the Objectivity of History
Published by OxyScholar, 2016
 you say that it is a matter of “distinguish[ing] different tiers of causality,” 
having in mind, presumably, Braudel’s Mediterranean pyramid, one can oppose 
to you another type of “raveling-unraveling,” which would link, dialectically 
and not mechanically, different spheres of activity in their development.26 Here 
we remain within a domain that belongs to the order of epistemology; in this 
domain it is not the qualification “critical” but the reality of historical practice 
that decides among the theories and the schemes of determination that depend 
on it. 
 But from there you do not keep to the order of epistemology. In saying: 
“But this ordering will always remain precarious, for to arrange in a composite 
whole various causalities which are scarcely homogeneous and which have 
themselves been established and properly constituted by analysis raises a 
practically insoluble problem”;27 in saying, later (and supposing that the text 
indeed translates your thinking, for in question is an oral response): “I will 
never say that what this objectivity in itself comprises are laws. History as it 
takes place comprises neither laws nor even facts. Facts and laws derive from 
the very elaboration of historical knowledge”;28 in holding Marx, for that 
reason, to be “precritical” and methodologically “naive”;29 in writing, at the 
conclusion of your “philosophical” meditation, that “the historian’s quandaries, 
caught as he is between the event-filled aspect and the structural aspect of 
history, between the great personages who make their appearance and the 
slowly progressing forces, or even the stable forms of the geographical 
environment,” have their basis in an “antinomy of historical time”30 – in all of 
these judgments you manifestly depart from the epistemological order, and you 
recommence the very undertaking of Aron; you fall back and short of the level 
of what you call the “intention of objectivity”; you fall back into the sphere of 
“everyday subjectivity” of which you proclaim the “epoché” to be necessary, 
                                                      
26 Loc. cit. I cannot help remarking that, in fact, you show a marked preference for Braudel’s 
schema over other schemas, and in particular over the Marxist schema. (Cf. your response to 
Vilar: “One must renounce the privilege of the infrastructure and acknowledge the perfectly 
circular character of that causality.”) I do not see how that choice can claim for itself the 
privileges of “critical” and transcendental lucidity. It is a choice in favor, not only of a type 
of causality, but also of the role of “geography,” of the economy, of politics, of ideology, and 
of their relations – in short, it is a choice in favor of a certain general theory of history, at 
once “economist” and “idealist,” by which you are manifestly seduced. But it is not that 
theory itself which furnishes the standard by which it can be judged. 
27 Loc. cit. 
28 “Objectivité et subjectivité en histoire,” cit. supra, p. 41. (These sentences do not appear in 
Histoire et vérité.) 
29 Loc. cit. (Likewise, Ricoeur scratched these remarks from the 1955 version of his text.) 
30 “Objectivity and Subjectivity in History,” p. 39. 
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 but in adorning it with all of the prestige of the transcendental!31 In short, you 
constitute, outside of the field of science, the truth of the object of which science, 
precisely, pursues the true knowledge. 
 The same can be said of the remarks that you develop on the subject of 
the other “specific features” of historical objectivity: that the historian stands 
“at a distance” from the past of which he speaks; that the object of history is “a 
different man.”32 For, finally, this notorious “distance,” which is “one of the 
sources of the inexact and non-rigorous characteristic of history,” this distance 
in which “[h]istorical time […] sets its own dissimulating work, its disparity, 
against the assimilative quality of the understanding […] wherein we have 
recognized, since the time of Plotinus, the irreducible phenomenon of self-
alienation, of drawing out, of distension, in a word, of original ‘otherness’ ”33 – 
this distance is a transcendental category only for those who hold that history is 
the resurrection, or the “emotional coinciding,” that you have done so well to 
put in its place!34 For the historian it is nothing outside of the very problems 
that he poses, problems which are problems of language (such as you say are 
“necessarily equivocal” because necessarily historical!35) only in the measure that 
they are problems of scientific terminology, problems that concern the 
determination of reality: it is a matter of knowing whether the same concept 
indeed comprehends the same reality. Can one speak of “imperialism” in regard 
to the Greek city-states, in the exact sense in which Lenin speaks of 
imperialism? Can one speak unequivocally of the bourgeoisie from the sixteenth 
on through the twentieth century? Of the same Christianity for the primitive 
Church and for the Church of the Middle Ages? But have you yourself not 
written: “the consciousness of an era, which the historian tries to reconstruct 
within his most far-reaching syntheses, is nourished by all the interactions and 
varied relations he has won through analysis”?36 Where, then, is that 
“distance”? Is it an a priori of historical knowledge? Or, on the contrary, as you 
show, is it not to be found at the end of the historical work, not as what is 
immediately given in perception, nor as a transcendental category, but as the 
result of historical knowledge? 
 As to that “cross” – alas, religious indeed – that a millenarian tradition 
forces the philosopher to bear, that “decisive feature,” “that specific distance 
which stems from the fact that the other is a different man,” that specificity 
                                                      
31 Ibid., p. 31. 
32 Ibid., p. 28. 
33 Ibid., p. 27. 
34 Ibid., p. 24. 
35 Ibid., p. 27. 
36 Ibid., p. 24. 
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 which makes history “an extension into another subjectivity”37 – I can see that 
you are in an awkward position indeed, in having to demonstrate as much after 
you have condemned the resurrection of the dead and emotional coinciding. 
You say that, “since we are unable to relive what they lived,” the “only way of 
evoking man that is open to us” is to make “the values of past men surge 
forth.”38 I very much fear that these values are for you a means of consolation. 
For how are they accessible to you? I do not think that they are given to you 
directly. It is the labor of history that gives an account of them, and access to 
them is not possible except by way of the scientific abstraction that casts light 
on the monuments to them that remain. Likewise, in what sense can that 
“decisive feature” (that human beings are the object of history) ever be a 
revelation for the historian? In what sense can that “distance” constitute a 
transcendental dimension of historical objectivity?39 Either it is a matter merely 
of stating a truism: the historian knows perfectly well that it is human beings 
who make history, and he proposes precisely to show how they undergo the 
history that they make; or else, and this is of greater consequence, but by no 
means scientific, it is a matter of proposing that the “extension into another 
subjectivity” is the end of history, which, I believe, is meaningless for the 
historian, though it may have a sense for the philosopher of history, concerned 
as he is to revivify values or the thought of a master. Do you not show as much 
in the final section of your lecture, in regard to the history of philosophy? Or, 
finally, it is a matter of opposing to the objectivity to which history has actually 
attained an inexhaustible human nature, a freedom of which the effects cannot 
be foreseen, which refutes in advance any claim on the part of history to 
objectivity. 
 It is on the subject of this misunderstanding that I would like to 
conclude. I am leaving to one side the final section of your text, but it is also of 
its presuppositions that I am going to speak. For there is good reason to 
wonder whether the philosophical grounds of your disavowal of Aron are not 
themselves disavowed by your fundamental philosophical positions. What 
distinguished you at first from Aron was your defense of the objectivity and the 
rationality of history. But you have found the ground of that objectivity, 
beyond its methodological content, only in an “intention of objectivity” 
suspended in some sense from itself, from the “choice” that is proper to it. 
                                                      
37 Ibid., pp. 28-9. 
38 Ibid., p. 29. 
39 I do not see how you can escape, by means of that argument and the use that you make of 
it, the temptation of taking up, or the risk of committing your reader to taking up, the well-
worn theme of the radical distinction between the sciences of nature, which can be sciences 
because they bear on nature, and the sciences of “man,” which cannot truly be sciences 
because their object is man, the very opposite of an object, etc. . . . 
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 Granted, you have enumerated the operations of rationalization that the 
historian effects. But you have considered them internally, without showing 
their fundamental relation to the very content of the general theory and the 
“critical” reality of history. Having stripped the object of its actual content, you 
have attributed to it a content that you have elaborated outside of the domain 
in which the scientific truth of history is constituted. And it is ultimately this 
content (a mixture of “immediate truths” and philosophical concepts) that you 
have made into the judge of scientific objectivity, on the pretext of specifying 
its distinctive characteristics. It is clear to see that, in thus constituting the 
“subjectivity” and the objectivity of history, you were preparing a transition, 
naturally, toward that “high level of subjectivity” which is “properly 
philosophical,” and which dominates the final section of your text.40 It is clear 
to see that you have taken history seriously (for you credit its reality, and you 
have shown as much at other encounters than that at Sèvres), but you have 
taken seriously only that in it which was necessary to guide it, the moment 
having arrived, toward its completion: a philosophy of history. I confess, 
therefore, that I was unable to read without irony (I am speaking of course of a 
historical irony) the reproach of “precritical naiveté” that you address to certain 
of your Marxist interlocutors. For, if I have understood Kant, or what is best in 
his teaching, is not the “naive,” the “precritical” philosopher the one who 
constitutes, outside of the very conditions of objective knowledge, a truth, a 
thing in itself, that he substitutes for actual knowledge? 
 I would like to justify these too critical remarks by elucidating them from 
another, more general point of view. It seems to me, indeed, that the best 
minds today, when they reflect on history, and, I would add, even when they 
reflect on the sciences of nature, do not escape a misunderstanding concerning 
the actual function of scientific knowledge. 
 I see the source of this misunderstanding in a contemplative attitude, 
which “awaits” from science a sort of reproduction, re-animation, re-
presentation, or rather re-presentification, of the real itself in its immediacy. 
When it is shown to us that history, in varying degrees, is incapable of 
restituting to us the “authentic” past, the singular flavor of an event, like the 
madeleine on Proust’s tongue, or the future in the doubtful combat of an 
uncertain present; when it is shown to us that history is unfaithful, “distanced,” 
and by nature denaturing, that in its laws and its categories it betrays the 
immediate experience of the freedom, the contingency, and the will of the 
human being; when to the laws of history one opposes history as it is lived, it 
                                                      
40 Ibid., p. 22. 
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 seems to me that we are doubly abused, both as regards the aim that a science 
affords itself and as regards the actual function of that science.41 
 I am indeed speaking of science in general, and not only of the science 
of history or the human sciences. For, in listening to the commentary on these 
antinomies of history, one cannot help thinking of those Cartesians who did 
not for the life of them know what to do with the gift of a second sun that the 
astronomers had given them. How was one to bring into agreement the sun of 
the farmer and the sun of the astronomer? One had one sun too many. That of 
science. And one was incapable of chasing away the image of the other one, of 
“making it be seen” otherwise than at “a distance of two hundred feet.” What a 
quandary! All the God in the world could not have gotten them out of it. In 
truth, there was one sun too many only for those who were nostalgic for 
perception, who were afraid that, by believing in the other sun, they would lose 
their sun at a distance of two hundred feet, and who thus awaited from the 
astronomer a re-creation of the sun itself; who did not see, if I may put it thus, 
that this second sun neither replaced nor did away with the first, but, removed 
as it was, made it possible to have a knowledge of the immediately perceived 
sun and to act upon its effects. There was not one sun too many for the 
astronomers, the physicists, and the whole active breed of “masters and 
possessors of nature”! Today as then, what one more or less consciously opposes 
and proposes to history is the same absurd task of producing a second sun that 
would be the brother and the double of the first, of producing, by one knows 
not what miracle, a second history in which the immediacy of history would be 
resuscitated, alive, present. . . . And because, obviously, one does not rediscover 
that first history in the science of history, one holds that against it. One 
reproaches (more or less consciously) the science of history for not being history in 
its immediacy, for not being history as it is “lived,” the history of “man,” of 
“freedom.” More than that, one reproaches it for preventing one from seeing the 
sun at a distance of two hundred feet, I mean for preventing human beings 
from being free, for preventing life from being lived in its “contingency,” for 
preventing art from being savored as an aesthetic object – in short, one 
reproaches the science of history for threatening to deprive human beings of 
the charms or the dramas of immediate life, for the reason that it grasps its 
necessity and its laws. 
 How is one not to see, at the basis of that argument, a misrecognition of 
the specific level at which every science is established, and at the same time a 
nostalgia for a sort of absolute knowledge or resurrection of bodies? As little as 
                                                      
41 How else is one to interpret your intervention? “History as it takes place comprises neither 
laws nor even facts. Facts and laws derives from the very elaboration of historical 
knowledge.” 
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 the knowledge of the laws of light has ever prevented human beings from 
seeing, and even from seeing the sun as though at a distance of two hundred 
feet, or replaced or threatened their simple gaze, just as little does the 
knowledge of the laws that preside over the development of societies prevent 
human beings from living; just as little does it take the place of work, of love, 
and of struggle. On the contrary: the knowledge of the laws of light has 
produced eyeglasses, which have transformed the gaze of men, just as the 
knowledge of the laws of society has produced undertakings that have 
transformed and broadened the horizons and the existence of the human 
being. 
 The antinomy of history-as-science and history-as-lived ceases when one 
ceases to “await” from science anything other than what it gives. It ceases when 
one has a conception of the level at which scientific truths are established; it 
ceases when one has a conception of the practical purpose of science, which 
departs from immediacy and rises to the level of generality, of laws, only so as 
to return to the concrete, not as the double of immediacy, but as the effective 
knowledge of it. It seems to me that that is what Marx meant when he 
reproached Feuerbach for having conceived of “reality […] only in the form 
[…] of contemplation” (a form forever haunted by the nostalgia for an “intuitus ori-
ginarius”), instead of conceiving of it as a “practice” of which science is only a 
moment: that of truth.42 
 
Translated by Charles Gelman 
                                                      
42 Theses on Feuerbach, I. 
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